My research interests are primarily in moral philosophy, moral psychology, and animal ethics. I am especially interested in the philosophy of love and relationships, and in human-animal relationships in particular.
In my dissertation, I develop and defend an account of love, as “caring attachment,” that is both informed by and accounts for the experience of loving a companion animal. In addition to developing the arguments of the dissertation into several stand-alone papers (in the present and near future), my wider research project raises two further questions. First, regarding love’s epistemology: does loving give us a special kind of access to the value of the beloved, such that through loving non-human animals we might learn something about their moral status? Second, what does love demand of us, and how do we love well? And in particular, is it possible to live up to love’s demands (or, indeed, the demands of morality) within the context of historical relationships of domestication and their wider social and political setting? |
Dissertation
Loving Gracie: An Account of Human-Animal Love
Committee: Martha Nussbaum (chair), Agnes Callard, Matthias Haase
Drawing on my own experience with my dog, Gracie, I develop a philosophical account of love that takes seriously, where most philosophers have not, the possibility of loving a non-human animal. According to my account, we should understand the love that we have for our friends, romantic partners, family members, and animal companions, as various iterations of the distinctive form of love that takes as its object a “somebody” – a locus of subjective experience with whom there is a possibility of intersubjective “togetherness” – and occurs in the context of a personal relationship. I characterize such love as “caring attachment” and the relationship in which it occurs as a (dyadic) affectional bond. I argue that such affectional bonds are possible between humans and non-human animals, and I illustrate this through a detailed description of the bond between Gracie and me. Thus, the possibility of loving a non-human animal is explained by the fact that we have something deeply in common – a need and capacity for affectional bonding.
For a longer overview of the dissertation, click here.
Committee: Martha Nussbaum (chair), Agnes Callard, Matthias Haase
Drawing on my own experience with my dog, Gracie, I develop a philosophical account of love that takes seriously, where most philosophers have not, the possibility of loving a non-human animal. According to my account, we should understand the love that we have for our friends, romantic partners, family members, and animal companions, as various iterations of the distinctive form of love that takes as its object a “somebody” – a locus of subjective experience with whom there is a possibility of intersubjective “togetherness” – and occurs in the context of a personal relationship. I characterize such love as “caring attachment” and the relationship in which it occurs as a (dyadic) affectional bond. I argue that such affectional bonds are possible between humans and non-human animals, and I illustrate this through a detailed description of the bond between Gracie and me. Thus, the possibility of loving a non-human animal is explained by the fact that we have something deeply in common – a need and capacity for affectional bonding.
For a longer overview of the dissertation, click here.
Current and Upcoming Projects
"Loving Somebody: Accounting for Human-Animal Love" (Under Review)
In many philosophical accounts of love, it is assumed that love is directed only toward other human beings. Some philosophers argue that love is more narrowly directed only at other “persons,” defined by the capacity for normative self-reflection. Neither view can account for the possibility – experienced by many – of loving a non-human animal. The former lacks a clear principle for excluding animals and the latter excludes animals at the cost of also excluding infants and some severely cognitively disabled humans. Another kind of view argues that love can take basically any kind of object. This is a mistake, I argue, since it fails to capture the intuitive distinction between loving somebody, and any attitude we might have toward a mere something. I argue that this is the very distinction we need, and that loving a non-human animal is an instance of loving somebody. This captures the continuity between the love one can have for an animal companion and the love one can have for the other “special somebodies” in one’s life, such as one’s friends, family, and romantic partners.
“Living Together: Promoting Agency for Companion Animals Through the Co-Construction of Daily Life"
I was recently awarded a $12,000 Balzan Junior Scholar Award, as part of Martha Nussbaum’s research project, Animal Capabilities, Ethics, and Law: New Directions, in association with her 2022 Balzan Prize, the goal of which is to produce a conference volume on animal ethics and law, focusing on the contribution of Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach. I was awarded a Balzan Junior Scholarship for my paper proposal “Living Together: Promoting Agency for Companion Animals Through the Co-Construction of Daily Life." My proposed paper draws on Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to animal ethics (e.g. Nussbaum 2022) and the arguments of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka for domesticated animal citizenship (e.g. Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2013) to argue that the commitment to animal agency inherent in these views takes on a distinctive, and distinctively demanding, form from the point of view of those who live with, and are responsible for, a non-human animal companion. I argue that the particular conditions of dependency of companion animals on their humans necessitate collaboration in the exercise of companion-animal agency, and that what we should strive toward in these relationships is thus the “co-construction of daily life.” I will present this paper at a research conference at the University of Chicago Law School in February 2025 before revising it for submission to the conference volume. You can view the full paper proposal here.
"Relationships with Non-Human Animals"
I have been invited to contribute a chapter on "Relationships with Non-Human Animals" for The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Personal Relationships (co-edited by Monika Betzler and Sarah Stroud, under contract with Oxford University Press). I will have a complete draft of this paper by January 2025.
In many philosophical accounts of love, it is assumed that love is directed only toward other human beings. Some philosophers argue that love is more narrowly directed only at other “persons,” defined by the capacity for normative self-reflection. Neither view can account for the possibility – experienced by many – of loving a non-human animal. The former lacks a clear principle for excluding animals and the latter excludes animals at the cost of also excluding infants and some severely cognitively disabled humans. Another kind of view argues that love can take basically any kind of object. This is a mistake, I argue, since it fails to capture the intuitive distinction between loving somebody, and any attitude we might have toward a mere something. I argue that this is the very distinction we need, and that loving a non-human animal is an instance of loving somebody. This captures the continuity between the love one can have for an animal companion and the love one can have for the other “special somebodies” in one’s life, such as one’s friends, family, and romantic partners.
“Living Together: Promoting Agency for Companion Animals Through the Co-Construction of Daily Life"
I was recently awarded a $12,000 Balzan Junior Scholar Award, as part of Martha Nussbaum’s research project, Animal Capabilities, Ethics, and Law: New Directions, in association with her 2022 Balzan Prize, the goal of which is to produce a conference volume on animal ethics and law, focusing on the contribution of Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach. I was awarded a Balzan Junior Scholarship for my paper proposal “Living Together: Promoting Agency for Companion Animals Through the Co-Construction of Daily Life." My proposed paper draws on Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to animal ethics (e.g. Nussbaum 2022) and the arguments of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka for domesticated animal citizenship (e.g. Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2013) to argue that the commitment to animal agency inherent in these views takes on a distinctive, and distinctively demanding, form from the point of view of those who live with, and are responsible for, a non-human animal companion. I argue that the particular conditions of dependency of companion animals on their humans necessitate collaboration in the exercise of companion-animal agency, and that what we should strive toward in these relationships is thus the “co-construction of daily life.” I will present this paper at a research conference at the University of Chicago Law School in February 2025 before revising it for submission to the conference volume. You can view the full paper proposal here.
"Relationships with Non-Human Animals"
I have been invited to contribute a chapter on "Relationships with Non-Human Animals" for The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Personal Relationships (co-edited by Monika Betzler and Sarah Stroud, under contract with Oxford University Press). I will have a complete draft of this paper by January 2025.